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Abstract
This paper proposes an alternative to the classical price-adjustment
mechanism (called “taˆtonnement” after Walras) that is second-order in
time. The proposed mechanism, an analogue to the damped harmonic
oscillator, provides a dynamic equilibration process that depends only on
local information. We show how such a process can result from simple
behavioural rules. The discrete-time form of the model can result in two-
step limit cycles, but as the distance covered by the cycle depends on
the size of the damping, the proposed mechanism can lead to both highly
unstable and relatively stable behaviour, as observed in real economies.
Keywords: SMD theorem, iterative price mechanism
1 Introduction
Economic life is plagued by uncertainty; speculation, crop failures, and new
entries into a market can shift prices, sometimes dramatically. Economic the-
ory reflects this uncertainty, and in the search for market equilibria economists
found that instability can arise from small changes in behaviour in an already
stable economy. However, these results appear to have gone too far [1], because
they imply both that instability should be a common occurrence [16] and that
an already stable economy can become unstable after modest changes in be-
haviour [8]. Moreover, the discrete-time version of dynamic price models can
be unstable, even if the continuous-time version is stable [13]; and discrete-time
dynamics are more relevant to economics [9]. This degree of model instability is
inconsistent with much economic activity because, outside of specialized mar-
kets like the stock market or real estate, most people do not experience extreme
changes in prices in their day-to-day lives. They go to the local market or store
with the expectation that prices may have shifted a bit, but not wildly, giving
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them enough certainty to plan and pace their spending.1
Instabilities in economic theory arise from two sources: lack of constraints on
the aggregate response to a change in prices, and the price adjustment dynamic.
The classical price adjustment mechanism, called “taˆtonnement”, or “groping”,
by Le´on Walras [20, 19] is a first-order dynamic equation, as formulated by
Samuelson [15]. In this paper we focus on a particular type of instability, non-
convergence in economies with stable equilibria—that is, economies where the
Jacobian of the excess demand function has negative eigenvalues at one or more
equilibrium. We argue, by analogy with the damped harmonic oscillator, that a
second-order discrete-time equation with damping can capture both the insta-
bility (e.g., the stock market) and relative stability (e.g., at the local market)
seen in real economies. The difference is caused by the coefficient of the damping
term. We show how the proposed mechanism can arise from simple behavioural
rules.
1.1 The SMD theorem
Economic statics and dynamics derive from behavioural responses to relative
supply and demand of different commodities in a market. The behaviour of both
sellers and buyers is stimulated by the market price of the commodity. Economic
statics finds the price that equates supply and demand, while economic dynamics
specifies how prices change over time when supplies and demands differ. When
supplies and demands are equal for all commodities—that is, excess demand,
the difference between demand and supply, is zero for every commodity—the
system is at equilibrium, and the time rate of change of every price is zero.
Excess demand is captured by the excess demand function, ξ(p). It is a
vector function, with a value for each commodity, that depends on a vector
of prices, one for each commodity. In the theory of General Equilibrium, the
excess demand function has the following properties [6]: i) it is continuous; ii)
it is homogeneous of degree zero; and, iii) it satisfies Walras’ law, p · ξ(p) = 0.
Walras’ law says that, for the economy as a whole, the money value of total
demand must equal the money value of total supply, although individual markets
can be out of equilibrium.
In a series of paper, Sonnenschein [17], Mantel [11], and Debreu [5] showed
that any function satisfying the three conditions listed above can be expressed
as a sum of well-behaved individual demand functions. This theorem, called
the “SMD theorem” after the three authors, was a startling result, because
it implies that microeconomic foundations place almost no constraints on the
possible forms of the macroeconomy. Later, Kirman and Koch showed that the
SMD result holds even if consumers have almost identical preferences [8]. The
general conclusions of the theorem have been shown to be quite robust [1].
1From personal experience, this is true even in bazaars, where bargaining is the norm.
Sellers know the “correct” price, and knowledgeable buyers know the standard markup.
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1.2 Classical taˆtonnement and the ubiquity of instability
The SMD theorem by itself says nothing about stability of the general equi-
librium. Any statement about stability requires dynamics—a mathematical
statement of how prices change. Following Walras and Samuelson, classical
taˆtonnement is a first-order dynamic process,
dp
dt
= k|p|ξ(p). (1)
In this paper we assume that the prices of all commodities respond in the same
way to excess demand, and that demand for all goods is expressed in a compara-
ble unit, [demand]; we do not have to make these assumptions, but it simplifies
the presentation. In the equation above, the factor of |p| ensures that when the
price vector is scaled by an arbitrary factor, both sides of the equation remain in
balance. The coefficient k, which is assumed to be the same for all commodities,
has units of [demand]−1[T ]−1.
In a discrete-time representation, which is more realistic because reaction to
a change in prices is delayed from one time interval to the next [9], this dynamic
can be expressed as
pN+1 = pN + k|p|ξ(pN )∆t. (2)
When excess demand is high, the price rises proportional to the gap. When it
is low, the price falls, again proportional to the gap. Scarf [16] showed exam-
ples of excess demand functions, expressed as a sum of reasonable individual
demand functions, that have no stable equilibria for any set of prices under
traditional taˆtonnement. More importantly for this paper, he showed examples
of repetitive limit cycles. All of his limit cycles arose in theories with unstable
equilibria. Later, Saari [14, 13] showed that any price adjustment mechanism
that involves the first difference of the price (but, possibly, historical values
of the excess demand function) will, for some excess demand functions, fail to
converge from an open set of initial points to a stable equilibrium. Saari con-
sidered discrete-time models and showed that even with stable equilibria the
dynamic processes that he considered could give rise to limit cycles and other
non-convergent trajectories.
Instability is a feature of real economies, so from one view the Saari results
are not surprising. However, because of the SMD theorem, a well-functioning
economy can, if consumers or producers change their behaviour even slightly,
shift to an unstable state in which prices vary wildly; this is a problem. For
most people, especially in high-income countries, daily economic life is relatively
stable. Also, limit cycles are rare; except for seasonal price changes, which are
driven by external, not internal, forces, sellers do not repeatedly cycle through
a set of prices.
1.3 Alternatives to classical taˆtonnement
Failure to converge is often identified with the SMD theorem. It is indeed a con-
sequence of the SMD result, but also depends on economic dynamics. Classical
3
taˆtonnement, with its first-order dynamics, seems like a parsimonious model,
but if it means widespread instability, then it does not agree with much of day-
to-day economic life. Saari [13] studied a general class of iterative price mecha-
nisms, but each of them was first-order (or first-difference) in price. Subsequent
authors have identified a variety of unstable and chaotic behaviour for different
iterative price mechanisms [2, 18, 21], while others have identified mechanisms
that reduce instability [3, 7, 9, 4, 10] by either restricting the form of the excess
demand function, bounding changes in price, or both. However, each of these
proposals uses a first-difference dynamic, determining prices at one time step
from prices at the immediately previous time step.
In this paper we propose an alternative dynamic, suggested by the damped
harmonic oscillator. It allows for quasi-periodic behaviour but also dissipation,
so that disturbances away from equilibrium gradually decrease.
2 A second-order taˆtonnement process
The classical taˆtonnement process in Equations (1, 2) has a clear economic
interpretation: if demand is higher than supply, sellers adjust prices upward
by an amount proportional to the gap; if demand is low, they adjust prices
downward to try to stimulate demand. In the second-order process proposed in
this paper, the rate of change of the rate of change of price responds to non-zero
excess demand. When a gap opens between demand and supply, sellers do not
respond right away. Instead, they start to increase prices, gradually at first, and
then, if the excess demand gap persists, more rapidly.
To motivate the mechanism, we show how the basic behaviour emerges from
a simple model in which there are two types of sellers: group a watches sales
and inventory to gauge the level of excess demand and set its price, while group
b looks at what other people are doing, setting their own price increase at time
t based on the average price rise at time t− 1. As we now show, these rules give
rise to a second-order dynamic that can lead to cyclic, or “pulsing” behaviour,
as observed in experimental situations [12]. These rules can be written2
∆pa,t = µξ(p¯t−1), (3a)
∆pb,t = ν∆p¯t−1. (3b)
If a fraction fa of sellers are of type a, and a fraction fb = 1− fa are of type b,
then we can compute ∆p¯t = fa∆pa,t + fb∆pb,t to give
∆p¯t = faµξ(p¯t−1) + fbν∆p¯t−1. (4)
Subtracting ∆p¯t−1 from both sides gives a second-order equation,
∆p¯t −∆p¯t−1 = faµξ(p¯t−1)− (1 − fbν)∆p¯t−1. (5)
2Properly, we should use the mean of excess demand evaluated at different prices, rather
than excess demand at the mean price. However, since we are motivating the formula rather
than deriving it, we assume for simplicity that all price movements are such that ξ(pt−1) ≅
ξ(p¯t−1).
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if fbν < 1 then the second term on the right-hand side is a damping term, as
we show below.
We now present a second-order taˆtonnement process and show some of its
properties. We begin by commenting on the mathematics of classical, first-order
taˆtonnement.
2.1 Continuous-time formulation
The continuous-time version of classical taˆtonnement is shown in Equation (1).
Suppose that, with this dynamic, an economy starts close to an equilibrium p∗,
so that ξ(p∗) = 0. Then, because the excess demand function is continuous, we
can expand it to first order in the vicinity of the equilibrium, to find
d∆p
dt
≈ k|p|Dξ(p∗) ·∆p, (6)
where Dξ is the Jacobian of the excess demand function. Whether an equi-
librium is stable depends on the signs of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, but
the homogeneity property of the excess demand function adds a complication.
Because the excess demand function is homogeneous of degree zero it always has
a zero eigenvalue, proportional to p∗. To see this, compute the excess demand
function at a point (1 + ǫ)p∗ that is close to the equilibrium point. This is
simply a scaling of the price vector by (1 + ǫ), so it does not change the value
of the excess demand function. Therefore,
Dξ(p∗) · p∗ = 0. (7)
A zero mode signals a potential instability, but it is not a problem in this
case because, from Walras’ law, price dynamics in classical taˆtonnement are
restricted to the hyphersphere defined by |p|2 = const.:
p ·
dp
dt
= k|p|p · ξ(p) (8a)
1
2
d|p|2
dt
= 0. (8b)
We note as an aside that it is common practice to restrict the price arbitrarily
to a simplex defined by
∑N
i=1 pi = 1, where N is the number of commodities [6].
Equation (8) shows that re-scaling to the simplex is not necessary, because the
dynamics already restrict prices to the hypersphere defined by
∑N
i=1 p
2
i = const.
Admittedly, this result only follows if all prices respond in the same way to
excess demand, as we assume in Equation (1), but a similar result holds if the
coefficient k varies by commodity.
Because of the zero mode in the Jacobian, we are interested in the eigenvalues
of the eigenvectors that span the space perpendicular to the equilibrium price
vector p∗. In this paper we are interested in cyclic behaviour around stable
equilibria. So, suppose that all of the eigenvalues are negative, and denote the
eigenvalue with the smallest absolute value by −λm/|p|. (The factor of |p| in the
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denominator normalizes the eigenvalues so they have units of demand.) Then,
from Equation (6), the price disturbance ∆p will decay to zero exponentially at
least as fast as exp(−kλmt).
We now propose the following second-order taˆtonnement process,
d2p
dt2
+ p
|p˙|2
|p|2
= k|p|ξ(p)− γ
dp
dt
, (9)
where γ is the damping coefficient and p˙ is the time rate of change of the price
vector. The somewhat odd second term on the left-hand side of this equation
ensures that the price vector stays on the hypersphere |p|2 = const. As above,
this is necessary to avoid problems with the zero mode parallel to the price
vector, shown in Equation (7), that arises from the homogeneity of the excess
demand function. To see that the price vector stays on the hypersphere, dot-
multiply both sides of the equation by p,
p ·
(
d2p
dt2
+ p
|p˙|2
|p|2
)
= p ·
(
k|p|ξ(p)− γ
dp
dt
)
(10a)
1
2
d2|p|2
dt2
− |p˙|2 + |p|2
|p˙|2
|p|2
= −
1
2
γ
d|p|2
dt
(10b)
1
2
d2|p|2
dt2
= −
1
2
γ
d|p|2
dt
. (10c)
If the magnitude of the price vector is not changing initially, then integrating
the final equation shows that it remains unchanging.
The perturbative version of Equation (6), analogous to Equation (6), is
d2∆p
dt2
≈ k|p|Dξ(p∗) ·∆p− γ
d∆p
dt
. (11)
The second term in Equation (9) is quadratic in ∆p, so it does not appear in
the perturbative equation. This is the damped harmonic oscillator, and the
solutions are well known. If all modes of the Jacobian are negative, with the
slowest mode equal to −λm/|p|, then perturbations decay at least as fast as
r = −
γ
2
+
√(γ
2
)2
− kλm. (12)
The damping term guarantees that a perturbation away from a stable equilib-
rium will return to the equilibrium point.
2.2 Discrete-time formulation
The discrete-time version of a well-behaved, convergent, continuous process may
not converge [13]. Discrete-time dynamics are more relevant than continuous-
time dynamics to economics, because prices are updated in discrete, sequential
events [9]. We therefore propose a discrete-time formulation of the second-
order process. In the discrete-time case, avoiding the zero-mode of the excess
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demand function’s Jacobian and staying on the |p|2 = const. hypersphere is
more complicated than in the continuous-time case. We therefore develop the
discrete-time formulation in stages, starting with a naive version,
˜˜pN+1 − 2pN + pN−1
∆t2
= k|pN |ξ(pN)− γ
pN − pN−1
∆t
. (13)
The two tildes over ˜˜p will be removed as we move from the naive formulation to
the final version. The geometric interpretation of each step is shown in Figure
1.
Figure 1: Construction of discrete-time price vector
Reorganizing Equation (13) and collecting the factors of ∆t into the excess
demand function and the damping factor, by defining ξˆ(p) ≡ ∆t2ξ(p) for excess
demand and γˆ ≡ γ∆t for damping, we find
˜˜pN+1 − pN = (1 − γˆ)((pN − pN−1) + k|pN |ξˆ(pN). (14)
As seen in Figure 1, this equation can give deviations ˜˜pN+1 − pN that are
parallel to pN , in the direction of the zero mode of the Jacobian of the excess
demand function. We therefore project the right-hand side of this equation onto
the hyperplane perpendicular to pN and define a revised difference equation,
p˜N+1 − pN =
(
1−
pNpN
|pN |2
)
·
(
˜˜pN+1 − pN
)
=
(
1−
pNpN
|pN |2
)
·
[
(1− γˆ)(pN − pN−1) + k|pN |ξˆ(pN)
]
= (1 − γˆ)
(
pN
pN · pN−1
|pN |2
− pN−1
)
+ k|pN |ξˆ(pN ).
(15)
In this calculation we used Walras’ law in passing from the second to the third
line. This is the second step in our construction, and so we have removed one
of the tildes from the price at time step N + 1.
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Our formulation, when we are finished, will preserve the magnitude of the
price vector. Accordingly, we can assume that |pN | = |pN−1| and write
p˜N+1 − pN = (1− γˆ) (pN cos θN − pN−1) + k|pN |ξˆ(pN ), (16)
where θN is the angle between pN and pN−1. By construction, |p˜N+1| > |pN |.
This follows because we have restricted the difference between the two price
vectors to the plane tangent to the hypersphere; therefore p˜N+1 lies outside the
hypersphere (see Figure 1). We find that
|p˜N+1| = |pN |
√
1 + (1− γˆ)2 sin2 θN + k2|ξˆ(pN )|2 − 2(1− γˆ)k
pN−1
|pN |
· ξˆ(pN ).
(17)
The final step in the construction of the discrete-time version of the taˆtonnement
process is to scale p˜N+1 to have the same length as pN . This gives the final
version for the price vector pN+1 (with no tilde),
pN+1 = A(pN ,pN−1; γˆ)
[
pN + (1− γˆ) (pN cos θN − pN−1) + k|pN |ξˆ(pN )
]
,
(18)
where A(pN ,pN−1; γˆ) is equal to |pN |/|p˜N+1|, the inverse of the square root
in Equation (17). Note that by construction A(pN ,pN−1; γˆ) < 1. In fact, as
can be seen in Figure 1, it is the cosine of the angle between pN and pN+1, or
cos θN+1.
2.3 Two-point limit cycles
Saari demonstrated that the discrete-time formulation of classical taˆtonnement
is not guaranteed to converge by constructing two-point limit cycles [13]. We
therefore discuss two-point limit cycles under our proposed mechanism; while
falling short of a full convergence analysis, it is revealing of how the damping
mechanism works. Suppose that there is a two-point limit cycle, in which the
price vector alternates between two values, a and b. That is,
b → a → b
‖ ‖ ‖
pN−1 pN pN+1.
(19)
Also suppose that we have chosen the normalization so that |a| = |b| = 1. Then,
b = A(a,b; γˆ)
[
a+ (1− γˆ) (a cos θN − b) + kξˆ(a)
]
. (20)
Next, recall that A(a,b; γˆ) = cos θN+1. For the two-point limit cycle this is the
same as cos θN , because θN+1 = −θN . We write the common value as cosα, so
that
b = cosα
[
a+ (1− γˆ) (a cosα− b) + kξˆ(a)
]
. (21)
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The difference between the price vectors is then
b− a = (cosα− 1)a+
k cosα
1 + (1 − γˆ) cosα
ξˆ(a). (22)
We are interested in the angle between these vectors, because it determines
the range of variation of the price. We have scaled the price vectors to have a
magnitude equal to one, so a · b = cosα. Using this relationship and Walras’
law, and taking the absolute square of both sides of Equation (22) we find, after
some rearrangement,
(1− cos2 α) [1 + (1− γˆ) cosα]
2
= k2 cos2 α|ξ(a)|2. (23)
As the damping γˆ gets very large, the second factor on the left-hand side of this
equation simplifies, and Equation (23) becomes the approximate equation
(1− cos2 α)γˆ2 cos2 α ≃ k2 cos2 α|ξ(a)|2, γˆ ≫ 1. (24)
Rearranging this equation and using the Taylor series expansion for cos2 α gives
an approximate value for α,
α ≃ ±
k
γˆ
|ξ(a)|, γˆ ≫ 1. (25)
Unless the excess demand |ξ(a)| is very large, α approaches zero as γˆ increases.
Therefore, at large damping the gap between two price vectors in a two-point
cycle is limited to a small angle.
3 Discussion
The second-order taˆtonnement process proposed in this paper has some advan-
tages over other proposals for constructing convergent iterative price adjustment
mechanisms. Convergence in the proposed process derives from heterogeneous
responses to changing price signals rather than from added constraints on the
excess demand function or arbitrary limits on the size of the price adjustment.
The size of the damping term can vary with the market, being either strong, as
for local food markets, or weak, as for the stock market. Under discrete-time
dynamics, prices can cycle endlessly, even with damping. However, damping
reduces the size of such cycles. Therefore the model allows for small shifts in
prices from one time interval to the next, even in relatively stable markets.
The proposed mechanism can be thought of as an aggregate approximation
to an actual market composed of individuals. Unlike representative agent mod-
els, the proposed mechanism assumes that people behave differently from one
another, and the different behaviours, when aggregated over a large number of
people, leads to the second-order and damped response to changes in excess
demand and changes in price. We showed explicitly how a second-order dy-
namic can emerge when some sellers set their prices based on price movements
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in the previous period, while others set their price based on sales and inven-
tory data. As observed in experimental settings [12], when participants use a
decision heuristic based on returns from the previous time step, the net result
is a “pulsing”, or cyclic, variation in the outcome; this is characteristic of a
second-order dynamic. Alternatively, a second-order dynamic could emerge in
a market with a few “bulls”, or optimistic sellers, some “bears” or pessimistic
ones, and a large number of “sheep”, sellers who go along with the trend. A
further possibility is that fatigue and disinterest gradually dissipate a repetitive
cycle of price-setting.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents an alternative to classical taˆtonnement. As in the classical,
first-order mechanism, changes in price arise from nonzero excess demand. The
proposed mechanism differs from the classical one in two ways: 1) the response
is second-order in time, so prices gradually accelerate, rather than jump; 2)
there is a damping term that opposes rapid changes in price, and slows them
down. We showed how such a mechanism can arise when heterogeneous agents
follow different simple rules to set prices.
For the proposed model we showed that in continuous time a deviation from
a stable equilibrium will return to the equilibrium. In discrete time we showed
that two-point cycles are possible, but the difference between prices, as measured
by the angle between the two price vectors, shrinks as the damping increases. We
conclude that a second-order dissipative price-setting mechanism is a promising
alternative to the classical first-order process.
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